Regional Effect of Trade Liberalization on the Firm-level Exports by Tan, Yong et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Regional Effect of Trade Liberalization
on the Firm-level Exports
Yong Tan and Liwei An and Cui Hu
Department of International Economics & Trade, Nanjing University
21 September 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81811/
MPRA Paper No. 81811, posted 11 October 2017 16:56 UTC
Regional Effects of Export Tax Rebate on
Exporting Firms: Evidence From China
Liwei Ana Cui Hub Yong Tana†
a: Department of International Economics & Trade, Nanjing University, 22
Hankou Road, Nanjing, P.R. China, 200093
b: School of International Trade and Economics, Central University of Finance
and Economics, 39 South College Road, Haidian District, Beijing, P.R.China,
100081.
Abstract
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a result of increased demand for local labor. First, the empirical results imply that a 1%
rise in the export tax rebate rate increases the export sales among continuing exporters
by 0.2% through the direct channel. Second, through the indirect channel, a 1% difference
in the regional rebate causes a 0.02% difference in exporters’ sales growth. Both effects
are statistically significant, and are consistent with the model’s predictions.
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1. Introduction
Value-added taxes are an indirect tax imposed at each stage of the production
process based on the amount of value-added associated production value. Most of
the world’s value-added taxes are imposed only on goods and services consumed
within their own taxing jurisdiction, also known as destination based VAT (Desai
and Hines, 2005). Feldstein and Krugman (1990) show that a destination based
VAT system with a complete tax rebate has no effect on exports and imports.
Therefore, unlike export subsidies, the VAT rebate (hereafter, ETR) has been
considered to be consistent with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) main
function of ensuring free and smooth trade. According to Bird and Gendron (2007),
until January 2007, at least 150 nations use an ETR regime. There is a general
belief that the ETR rate and firms’ exports are positively correlated when the
rebate rate is incomplete. A significant number of studies have found evidence to
support this claim (e.g. Chao et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2006; Chandra and Long,
2013). However, all those papers investigate the direct effect of ETR on export
volume. In our paper, we argue that in addition to direct effect, the ETR also has
an indirect effect on export volume through differential industrial composition.
Without taking the indirect effect into account, previous research neglects the
unequal indirect effect of ETR on the exports of firms located in different regions,
and an additional channel through which the ETR plays its role
While the direct effect of the ETR on firms’ exports reduces the variable cost of
exporting, the indirect effect of the ETR arises from competition for local laborers
among exporting firms. Specifically, when an increase in the ETR makes exporting
more profitable, exporting firms expand their production thus necessitating an
2
increase in demand for labor. This increased demand drives up the laborer’s wage.
As a consequence, the firm-level output and exports will be depressed.
We develop a theoretical model to illustrate both the direct and indirect mech-
anisms and examine them empirically in this paper. The principal goal of the
theoretical model is to uncover both the direct and indirect effect of the ETR
on firm-level export behavior. In line with most of the recent international trade
literature (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), we assume that labor is the
only input in the production and firms are heterogeneous in their productivity.
Within a country, each region is treated as a subeconomy with a different indus-
trial distribution of labor. When labor mobility is limited, the model shows that
a nation wide change in the ETR will lead to different firm-level export respons-
es. Intuitively, if other things are equal, and the ETR changes are identical in all
industries, the wage changes more in regions where more labor work in the export-
ing sectors. This implies that the indirect effect is larger in regions experiencing a
larger average regional ETR change.
We evaluate the model’s testable predictions using Chinese Customs data from
2000 to 2006. This data has several significant advantages. First, China offers an
ideal setting to investigate the impact of the ETR on firms’ exports. On the one
hand, it has experienced spectacular growth in international trade since the 1980s
(Wang and Wei, 2007), it annually exports the largest volume of products in the
world (Lin, 2010), and its outstanding trade growth has attracted considerable
attention because of the trade policies implemented by the Chinese government
(e.g. Eckaus, 2006; Girma et al., 2009). On the other hand, the Chinese gov-
ernment frequently changes the ETR rates to adjust its exports. Gourdon et al.
(2014) indicate that during the 2002 to 2012 period, 87% of products at the HS6-
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product classifications have undergone at least one ETR change. Second, China’s
setting also meets our assumption within the theoretical model, since labor mobil-
ity between regions in China is limited. In the era of the planned economy, China
introduced the Residence Registration System (Hukou system) to implement its
industrial development strategy. Under this system, labor mobility is extremely
restricted (Cai et al., 2002). Although restrictions on labor mobility have grad-
ually relaxed, labor mobility is still broadly restrained. This fact is helpful for
identifying the indirect effect of the ETR changes on firms’ exports, as exporting
firms located in regions, with different industrial compositions respond differently
to the same nation wide ETR changes. Third, we also directly observe the HS
code of export product and the location of exporting firms in this data set. This
feature is essential for us to construct measures of the industrial and regional ETR
rates, respectively.
Endogeneity of the ETR rate is one of the biggest concerns in the empirical
analysis (e.g. Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2014). Specifically, the
ETR rates may be set higher for industries where the majority of firms have high
export growth potential, or for industries where the majority of firms have poor
exporting performance in order to boost their exports. Either case suggests that
the OLS estimators might be biased. To ease this concern, we take advantage of
China’s dual trade regime to obtain our instrument variable. In China, firms export
under two regimes. One is the “ordinary” regime, which is common throughout
the world. The other is the “processing” regime, under which firms with supplied
materials are not eligible to receive any rebate. Since fiscal pressures are often
the driving force behind the Chinese government’s adjustment of the ETR rates,
we expect that industries with a larger share of processing trade firms face less
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fiscal pressure, and this in turn results in higher ETR rates. Meanwhile, the share
of processing trade within an industry would be independent of firm-level export
growth. As such, it can be used as an instrument to determine how the ETR
affect firms’ exports. In robustness checks, we also use the provincial deficit rate
suggested by Chandra and Long (2013) as an IV for the ETR rate. All results are
quite similar.
By using industry-level ETR and regional weighted average ETR to capture
direct and indirect effects, respectively, we find that a 1% increase in the ETR
rate will increase firm-level exports by 0.5%, while a 1% increase in the weighted
average ETR rate will decrease the firm-level exports by 0.2%. After using the
instrumental variable and controlling for firm’s self-selection into exporting, we find
that a 1% increase in the ETR rate will increase firm-level exports by 0.2%, and
a 1% increase in the regional weighted ETR rate will decrease firm-level exports
by about 0.02%. These results verify that the OLS estimator tends to be upward
biased, and that endogeneity bias should not be ignored when investigating the
impact of ETR on export sales among continuing exporters. The estimated indirect
effect of the ETR is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with
the model’s prediction. This result indicates that the direct effect of the ETR on
firms’ exports will be offset by the indirect effect caused by local wage changes.
It is important to note that the indirect effect measures the relative impact of
ETR changes on firms located in different regions. It does not measure the level
effect of regional wage change on firm-level exports. Thus, this paper captures the
fact that the indirect effect is not equal throughout the country, and regions are
differentially affected by ETR changes through the indirect channel.
This paper contributes to the literature in two distinct manners. First, we
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disentangle both the direct and indirect effect of the ETR on firms’ export sales
among continuing exporters. In theory, Feldstein and Krugman (1990) first point
out that the increase in the ETR rate will lead to a rise in exports. Chen et al.
(2006) develop a Cournot quantity competition model to examine the effect of the
ETR on export performance. Empirically, several papers investigate the relation-
ship between the ETR rate and export performance at the industrial or firm level
(e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Chandra and Long, 2013; Gourdon et al., 2014). How-
ever, none of them document the role which industrial composition plays in the
implementation of the ETR. Industrial distribution of labor is an essential factor
affecting exports (Cassey and Schmeiser, 2013; Krautheim, 2012), and failing to
consider it leads to overestimating the importance of the ETR on boosting exports.
Second, this paper also provides some insights into the recent growing body of
work that examines the export spillover effect. For example, Aitken et al (1997)
find that the export probability of Mexican plants is positively related with the
presence of multinational firms in the same state. Greenaway et al. (2004) find
that multinational firms have a positive influence on the export decision of UK
domestic firms. Greenaway and Kneller (2008) show that regional and sectoral
agglomeration encourages the entry of new firms in export markets. However,
Barrios et al (2003), in contrast, find no evidence to indicate that Spanish firms
can benefit from other exporters. Bernard and Jesen (2004) conclude the exporting
spillover effect does not exist among American manufacturing firms. Our paper,
which emphasizes the competition effect, can provide an explanation for these
inconsistent findings. That is, although the presence of other exports can have
positive externality by sharing information, or knowledge spillovers, it also might
exert negative effects on other firms by competing for scarce resources.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the model
and the hypotheses; Section 3 introduces the ETR system in China and describes
the construction of main variables in the empirical analysis. Section 4 reports the
estimated results of the direct and indirect impact on exporting firms’ intensive
margin. In section 5, we conduct robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
In this section, we develop a model to explain the direct and indirect mecha-
nisms through which the ETR affects firm-level export behavior.
2.1. Labor Supply
Consider a country that consists of many regions, indexed by j. Each industry
in this economy is denoted by i. Labor is the only input in production, and is
assumed to be mobile between industries, but not across regions. As a result,
the wage level is identical across different industries within a region, but can vary
across regions.1 In each region, labor is assumed to be inelastically supplied at its
aggregate level Lj.
2 In what follows, we suppress the regional index j for notional
simplicity.
1We can relax this assumption by assuming a fixed migration cost across regions. Labor will
not move across regions due to small regional wage differences.
2We have tried other forms for the labor supply function, such as Lj = aj + bjωj , where Lj
and ωj are labor supply and wages in region j. This function gives us the same results as the
inelastic labor supply function above.
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2.2. Labor Demand
A representative consumer’s preferences over varieties takes the CES form:
U =
[∫
ι∈Ω
q(ι)
σ−1
σ dι
] σ
σ−1
(1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two products, and σ > 1.3
Each firm in a region maximizes its profits by optimally choosing its output,
which determines the individual firm’s labor demand. The total regional labor
demand is constituted by the sum of labor demand in each industry
L =
∑
i
Li (2)
where Li is the total labor demand in industry i, which is the aggregate labor
demand of firms in industry i. We further divide labor demand for any firm in
industry i into domestic and foreign production labor demand. In this way, we
treat a firm as if it uses some of its labor to produce products for sale in the
domestic market, and uses the rest of its labor to produce the products for sale in
the foreign market. In particular,
li(ω, φ, ti) = l
ne
i (ω, φ) + 1ex · lei (ω, φ, ti) (3)
where 1ex is an indicator function of firm-level export status, which takes value 1
3We assume that the substitution of elasticity across different varieties in the same industry
is the same with that across different varieties from different industries. This assumption is to
simplify the proof of the model. However, we can show that our results will still hold if the
elasticity of substitution between varieties from the same industry is different from that between
varieties from different industries. The proof will be available by request.
8
if this firm exports, and 0 otherwise. The variable lei (ω, φ, ti) is the labor demand
of an exporting firm hired to serve the foreign market at wage level ω = {ωj, ω−j},
ETR rate ti and productivity φ. ωj denotes the wage in region j, and ω−j is a
wage vector denotes the wage in all other regions. Notice that the labor demand
of a representative firm located in a particular region j will be affected by wages
in other regions, ω−j. Because wages in other regions affect the residual demand
faced by firms in region j.4 lnei (ω, φ) is the labor demand that the firm which
serves the domestic market.5 For a non-exporting firm, it only hires labor to serve
the domestic market. The total labor demand in industry i is the aggregate labor
demand of individual firms used to serve the domestic and foreign markets. That
is,
Li =
∫
φ
i
(ω)
lnei (ω, φ)Mif (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
i
(ω,ti)
lei (ω, φ,ti)Mifi (φ) dφ (4)
where φ
i
(ω) and φe
i
(ω, ti) are the productivity cutoffs of industry i which serve
domestic and foreign markets, respectively, Mi is the total number of firms in
industry i located in this region, and fi (φ) is the productivity distribution in
industry i.6 Note that in this model, we are considering a short term phenomenon;
thus the mass of firms, Mi, is given,
7 but the mass of operating firms, Mai =
4This is a regional interaction. We thank a referee for pointing out this issue. Details will be
further discussed in the next section.
5Note that the ETR rate ti only directly affects the labor demands of exporting firms’ needed
to serve foreign markets, through changing their variable cost. It does not directly affect the
labor demand of firms, necessary for serving the domestic market.
6We have assumed that the mass of firms paying the entry cost is fixed. That says, we analyze
a short term impact of the ETR changes on firms’ performance.
7This assumption is used to obtain the subsequent analytical solutions. In particular, when
the productivity distribution follows a Pareto distribution, the mass of firms paying the entry
cost would be fixed. We thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
9
(1− F (φ
i
))Mi, is endogenously determined by the productivity cutoff φi.
Similar to Melitz (2003), the labor demand of a firm with productivity φ, hired
to serve the domestic market, is determined by
lnei (ω, φ) =
q(ω, φ)
φ
q(ω, φ) = Ai(ω)p(ωj, φ)
−σ
p(ωj, φ) =
σ
σ − 1
(
ωj
φ
)
Note that when firm-level sales and labor demand are determined by wage vector,
ω = {ωj, ω−j} because of regional interations, firm-level price only relies on the
regional wage ωj.
8 Consequently, the labor demand for a firm with productivity φ
used to serve the domestic market is as follows
lnei (ω, φ) = Ai(ω)
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
ω−σj (5)
where q(ω, φ) and p(ωj, φ) are the optimal sales and price in the domestic market,
respectively. Ai(ω) = Ai(ωj, ω−j) is the domestic residual demand for the products
of industry i, which depends on wage in region j and all other regions.9 Note that
the domestic residual demand also depends on the foreign wage, and we treat
8We thank a referee for pointing out this issue.
9In this version of the manuscript, the fixed production cost is assumed to be paid by using
capital instead of labor. However, we can show that if the fixed cost is paid by labor, all of
the following conclusions still hold. To show this we only need to write the labor demand
lnei (ω, φ) =
q(ω,φ)
φ + fi = γ(φ)
q(ω,φ)
φ , where γ(φ) = fi/
q(ω,φ)
φ . In the proof and the simulation,
we treat the fixed cost being paid by labor.
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foreign country as region 0, with wage ω0. In particular,
Ai(ω) =
∑J
j=1 ωjLj
P
P σ; (6)
P =
[
J∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
∫
φ
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
(
σ
σ − 1
ωj
φi
)1−σ
Mjf(φi)dφi
] 1
1−σ
Several issues are worth addressing here. First, firms of industry i located in
different regions face the same domestic residual demand. This is because residual
demand is determined by the home country’s aggregate income,
∑J
j=1 ωjLj, and
the price index, P . These two variables exhibit no regional variation. Second,
equation (6) implies that a change in the regional wage ωj will affect residual
demand faced by firms in region j and other regions, and hence affect firm-level
production in other regions.10 Note that an increase in the regional wage, ωj,
will increase the residual demand faced by firms in different regions by the same
amount.
Accordingly, the labor demand of an exporting firm with productivity φ, used
to serve the foreign markets, is given by
lei (ω, φ, ti) = A
∗
i (ω)
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ (7)
where, τ˜ =
τ(
1− τ2
τ
σ
) 1
σi−1
, τ2 = r − ti
A∗(ω) =
ω0L0
P ∗
P
∗σ;P ∗ =
[
J∑
j=0
I∑
i=1
∫ (
σ
σ − 1
τ˜ωj
φi
)1−σ
Mjf(φi)dφi
] 1
1−σ
10This is how regions interact. We thank a referee for pointing out this issue. Intuitively, if ωj
increases, the residual demand faced by firms in other region increases as the domestic consumers
become richer. Therefore, all other things equal, an increases in ωj increases the labor demand
in other regions.
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where A∗i (ω) = A
∗
i (ωj, ω−j) is the residual demand for products from industry i in
the foreign market, and P ∗ is the price index in the foreign country; r is the official
VAT rate collected; τ2 is the actual VAT rate paid after receiving the rebate, τ is
the iceberg transportation cost, and τ˜ is the rebate adjusted trade cost.11 Note
that when j = 0, τ˜ =1 since the foreign firms do not pay the trade cost in the
foreign market.
2.3. Equilibrium
In this section, we summarize the equilibrium in the economy with limited
labor mobility.
1. Consumers maximize their utility according to the preferences defined in
equation (1) and their income. The total income in the home country is∑J
j=1 ωjLj, while the total income in the foreign country is ω0L0.
2. Active firms located in each region maximize their profit by optimally hiring
labor and setting their price in domestic and foreign markets according to
equations (5)-(7).
3. In equilibrium, firms with cutoff productivity φ
i
(ω) earn zero total profit and
firms with cutoff productivity φe
i
(ω, ti) earn zero profit in the foreign market.
pi(ω, φ
i
(ω)) =
Ai(ω)
σ
σ
σ − 1
ωj
φ
i
(ω)
− ωjfi = 0 (Zero Profit)
pi∗(ω, φe
i
(ω, ti), ti) =
A∗i (ω)
σ
σ
σ − 1
τ˜ωj
φ
i
(ω)
− ωjf ∗i = 0
where ωjfi and ωjf
∗
i are the fixed cost in the domestic and foreign markets,
respectively.
11The proof is in the Appendix.
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The expected value for any potential firm in region j and industry i is zero:
∫
φ
i
(ω)
[
pi(ω, φi) + 1(φ > φ
e
i
(ω, ti)pi
∗(ω, φe
i
(ω, ti), ti)
]
f(φi) = ωjFe
(Free Entry)
4. The free entry and zero profit conditions together determine the productivity
cutoffs, φ
i
(ω) and φe
i
(ω, ti), for different industries across regions as functions
of regional wages and the ETR rates, ti. The regional wages, ω = {ωj, ω−j}
adjust until regional labor markets clear and trade balance.
L =
∑
i
Li (Labor Market Clearning)
J∑
j=1
∑
i
Xij =
∑
i
Xi0 (Balance of Trade)
where Li is the labor demand in industry i in a particular region defined in equation
(4) and L is the total labor supply in the same region. Xij is the total export
value in region j of industry i, and Xi0 is the aggregate export value by the foreign
country of industry i.
Xij =
∫
φe
i
A∗i (ω)[τip(ωj, ω−j, φ)]
1−σMif(φ)dφ
In sum, in the equilibrium, consumers maximize their utility and firms max-
imize their profit. Their optimal behaviors and regional wages determine the
productivity cutoffs, price index, residual demand, clear the labor market in each
region and balance trade. In the subsequent section, we introduce how a shock
affects the equilibrium.
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2.4. The Impact of the ETR on Exporting Firms’ Intensive Margin
From equation (7), the change in the ETR affects the variable cost of exporting
firms through the adjusted trade cost τ˜ . We can derive the following negative
relationship between the ETR rate, ti, and the adjusted trade cost τ˜ .
∂τ˜
∂ti
=
∂τ˜
∂τ2
∂τ2
∂ti
= τ1
(
− 1
σ − 1
)
(1 + τ2)
− σ
σ−1
(σ
τ
)
< 0. (8)
Equation (8) implies that, an increase in the ETR is identical to a decrease in the
rebate-adjusted trade cost τ˜ . From this it is evident that we can demonstrate the
following inequalities:
∂lnei (ω, φ)
∂ωj
< 0 (9.1)
∂lei (ω, φ, ti)
∂ωj
< 0 (9.2)
∂lei (ω, φ, ti)
∂ti
> 0 (9.3)
∂ωj
∂ti
> 0 (9.4)
Inequalities (9.1) and (9.2) imply that the labor demand of firms located in
region j, regardless whether the labor is used to serve the domestic and foreign
markets, is decreasing in the regional wage level ωj (ω = {ωj, ω−j}).12 The in-
tuition is that when facing a regional wage increase, all other things equal, firms
located in that region have a comparative disadvantage relative to firms located
12As shown in the appendix, Ai and A
∗
i are homogeneous of degree σ in (ωj , ω−j), which
implies
∑
j
∂Ai
ωj
ωj = σAi,
∑
j
∂A∗i
ωj
ωj = σA
∗
i .
∂lnei (ω,φ)
∂ωj
= Ai(
σ
σ−1 )
−σ
(
1
φ
)1−σ
(−σ)ω−σ−1j +
( σσ−1 )
−σ
(
1
φ
)1−σ
ω−σ−1j
∂Ai
∂ωj
ωj < 0. Note that we make use of the feature σ > 1.
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in other regions. As such, their market share will be stolen by their competitors
located in other regions and hence their sales and labor demand are smaller. In-
equality (9.3) implies that the direct impact of the ETR on exporting firms’ labor
demand, used to serve foreign markets, is positive. This is because an increase in
the ETR rate reduces exporting firms’ rebate-adjusted trade cost, τ˜ , and hence
increases labor demand among firms serving the foreign market. Last, inequality
(9.4) indicates a positive correlation between the ETR rate and the regional wage
level.13 The intuition for this result is that when industry i receives a higher ETR,
exporting firms expand their production, and as such increase the labor demand
hired to serve foreign markets. All other things equal, the equilibrium wage level
increases. All results continue to hold after allowing for firm-level entry and exit
in the domestic and foreign markets.
One concern is that inequalities (9.1) - (9.4) could be violated by regional
interactions. In particular, wage and export changes in one region could essentially
affect the residual demand (domestic or foreign) faced by firms located in other
regions, which in turn determines firm-level exports and labor demand.14 We have
proved in the Appendix that even after accounting for regional interaction effect,
inequalities (9.1) - (9.4) still hold. The intuition is that the regional interaction
effects operate through residual demand, Ai(ω) and A
∗
i (ω). When the wage, ωj, in
region j increases, firms located in different regions experience identical changes in
residual demand and, as such, after pinning down the regional interaction effect,
the indirect effect still manifests regional differences. A detailed proof is in the
13The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
14The residual demand in the domestic and foreign market, Ai, and A
∗
i , are functions of the
price index in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively. The price indexes are affected by
operating firms in all regions.
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Appendix.
Using similar logic, we argue that the balance of trade does not affect inequal-
ities (9.1) - (9.4). When the ETR rate, ti, increases, the foreign wage must fall to
balance the trade. This is due to the fact that the foreign country imports more,
which leads the least productive foreign firms to exit. As such, the aggregate labor
demand curve shift down in the foreign country. The adjustment of the foreign
wage, ω0, only affect Ai(ω) and A
∗
i (ω). The change in residual demand has an
identical impact for exporters located in different regions. After pinning down this
effect, the indirect effect still manifests regional differences.
From the above analysis, the ETR affects the firm-level intensive margin of
exports through two respective channels. The first is the direct channel, in which
the ETR affects the variable cost of exporting firms by refunding firms the tax
they pay. The other is the indirect channel in which the ETR affects the intensive
margin through changing the regional wage. To evaluate the impact of ETR
changes on the behavior of exporters, we have to disentangle the direct and indirect
impact of ETR changes.
2.5. Regional Differentiation in the Indirect Effect
Regions are heterogeneous in the distribution of labor across industries. The
differences in industrial composition across regions could be caused by regional
comparative advantage, e.g. geographic or policy advantages (Cai et al., 2002).15
15For instance, firms producing i−type goods located in different regions may face different
transportation costs. Suppose there are two industries, one is a tradable industry, and the other
is a non-tradable industry. Following Hsu et al. (2014), we can assume that each firm draws
a distinct variety by paying an entry cost, and the variety will be in the export sector with
probability λ. A firm with productivity φ in region j earns revenue from exporting: rj(φ) =(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
A∗c(φ)1−στ1−σj , j = 1 or 2. A
∗ is the residual demand in the foreign market. If
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A consequence of differing industrial composition across regions is that the regional
wage adjusts differently in response to the ETR changes. This model yields the
following relationship between wage changes and regional weighted average ETR
changes:
∆ωj =
∑
i
βi∆ti (10)
where, βi =
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti − Ci∑
k
σ
ωj
Lk +B
, Lei =
∑
i
∫
φe
lei (ω, φ, ti)Mif(φ)dφ
B =
∑
k
lek(ω, φ
e
k
, tk)Mkfk
(
φe
k
) ∂φe
k
∂ωj
, Ci = l
e
i (ω, φ
e
i
, ti)Mifi(φ
e
i
)
∂φe
i
∂ti
where Lei is the total labor demand of exporting firms hired to serve foreign mar-
kets, in industry i, and lei (ω, φ
e, ti) is the labor demand of firms, in industry i, with
cutoff productivity, φe, serving the foreign market. If we consider that the change
in the ETR is relatively small and its impact on the firm-level extensive margin
(entry and exit) is negligible, βi has a simplified presentation: βi =
Lei (−σ)τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
σ
ωj
L
.
Equation (10) implies a positive correlation between the weighted average ETR
change,
∑
i βi∆ti, and the change in the regional wage, ∆ωj. βi is positively cor-
related with αi =
Lei∑
j Lj
, the share of labor in industry i employed for export
production, up to an industry specific constant term.16 This implies that when
τ1 > τ2, and other things being equal, export firms will account for a larger share in region 2
relative to that in region 1. This simple example demonstrates that even two regions that are
identical in nearly every aspect, but have different transportation costs, may end up with having
differing industrial composition.
16βi =
(−σ)τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
σ
ωj
+ 1LB
αi−
1
LCi
σ
ωj
+ 1LB
.When the ETR change is small and its effect on firm-level extensive
margin is negligible,
∂φek
∂ti
≈ 0, we have βi = L
e
i (−σ)τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti∑
k
σ
ωj
Lk
= ωj
(
− ∂τ˜∂ti
)
αi. Since − ∂τ˜∂ti > 0, the
coefficient on αi is positive, and βi is positively correlated with αi. In the general case, when the
impact of ETR change on firm-level extensive margin is nontrivial, the result still holds. Notice
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two industries experience the same ETR change, the sector with a greater number
of employees (a higher βi) will have a larger impact on the regional wage. We
summarize the predictions of the model in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When the mobility of the regional labor force is limited, an ETR
increase has a positive direct impact and a negative indirect impact on the intensive
margin of firm-level export sales. The impact of industry-level ETR changes on
firm-level exports is smaller in regions experiencing larger weighted average ETR
changes.
The proposition implies that if the ETR changes are identical in all industries,
the intensive margin of exporting firms will change less in regions, where more of
labor is allocated to exporting sectors.
2.6. Comparative Statistics
In this section, we discuss the comparative statistics of the model to further
develop the intuition for our empirical results.17 In what follows, we focus our
discussion on a particular region j.
We first depict the influence of the residual demand on regional labor demand
curve in Figure 1. According to equations (5) and (7), at any given wage, the
individual firm’s labor demand is increasing in residual demand. Therefore, since
the aggregate regional labor demand is a sum of the individual firm’s labor demand,
at any given wage, it too is increasing in residual demand.
that B is independent of Le, and from equation (10) it is positive (
∂φe
k
∂ωj
> 0). The numerator of
(−σ)τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti
σ
ωj
+ 1LB
is positive and the denominator is also positive. As such, βi is again positively correlated
with αi.
17We thank a referee for suggesting a simple, graphic interpretation of our model.
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Figure 1: The Influence of Residual Demand on the Regional Labor Demand Curve
Figure 1 demonstrates that when the residual demand, Ai, increases to A
′
i
(There is a similar argument for A∗i ), the regional labor demand curve will shift
up from the black curve, Ai, to the blue curve, A
′
i.
We next depict the influence of an ETR change on the regional wage in Figure
2.
Figure 2: The Indirect Effect of an ETR Change on the Regional Wage
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In Figure 2 the X-axis is the quantity of labor, and the Y-axis is ωj, the regional
wage. The black curve (ti, Ai, A
∗
i ), is the labor demand curve in region j at ETR
rate ti, residual demand Ai and A
∗
i in the home and foreign countries respectively.
The vertical curve is the aggregate labor supply in this region, at L = Lj. The
intersection of the black curve and the vertical line determine the market clearing
regional wage, ωj0, at ti.
Now, consider an increase in the ETR, from ti to t
′
i, and t
′
i > ti. We first assume
away any change in residual demand, Ai and A
∗
i . As we have shown in the main
text, when the ETR increases in one industry i, without considering any change
in residual demand, exporting firms in this industry will expand production. This
is because lei (ω, φ, ti) = A
∗
i (ωj, ω−j)
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ−1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ. When A∗i (ωj, ω−j) is
unchanged, an increase in ti decreases the trade cost, τ˜ , which increases the labor
demand needed to serve the foreign market. This expansion will increase regional
labor demand. Therefore, the labor demand curve shifts up to the blue curve
(t
′
i, Ai, A
∗
i ). The new labor market clearing wage is ωj1.
However, the residual demand in the home and foreign countries will increase
when ωj increases. Notice that the wage increase in other regions also increase the
residual demand faced by firms in region j. This so-called regional interaction will
increase the residual demand even more. The increase in the residual demand will
further increase the labor demand necessary to serve both the domestic and foreign
markets as depicted in Figure 1. As such the aggregate labor demand curve shifts
up further in region j in response to the increase in the residual demand. The
regional wage continues to increase, which again increases the residual demand.
Note that although residual demand keeps increasing, it shifts up the labor demand
curve at a diminishing rate due to two reasons: for the same increase in residual
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demand, when the labor demand curve is in a higher position, on the one hand, the
continuing firms expand their labor demand less according to equations (5) and
(7) as they face a higher regional wage;18 on the other hand, the number of firms
expanding their labor demand is fewer as a higher regional wage requires a higher
productivity cutoff. The two points together imply that the movement of the
regional labor demand curve would stop at a upper limit. This process lasts until
the the labor demand curve reaches the position of the red curve (ti, A
′
i, A
∗′
i ). The
regional wage ωj2 and wages in other regions determine the new residual demand
A
′
i and A
∗′
i . The adjusted residual demand and new regional wages clear every
regional labor market.
In sum, an increase in the ETR, ti, will shift up the wage in a particular region
from ωj0 to ωj2, with ωj2 > ωj0. This increase in the regional wage implies that
an increase in the ETR, will decrease firm-level exports by increasing the regional
wage. Therefore, the indirect effect is negative.
Last, we use Figure 3 to illustrate how the indirect effect of the ETR differs
across regions. Suppose two regions are identical in every aspect, such as the
aggregate labor demand curve, the total population of labor, etc, except for their
industrial composition. In particular, we assume region 1 has a large share of labor
working in industry i, while no workers are employed in industry i in region 2.19
18 In particular, an increase in residual demand proportionally increases the firm-level labor
demand according to equations (5) and (7). When the regional wage is higher, the firm-level
labor demand is lower and hence the proportional increase in the firm-level labor demand is
smaller.
19Suppose everything is identical in region 1 and 2, but region 1 has an industry i while region 2
has an industry i′. The firms in these two industries have the same productivity distribution, and
the two industries face the same trade costs and ETR rates initially. If the remaining industrial
composition is the same in the two regions and industry i and i′ are exactly symmetric, region
1 and region 2 would have the same aggregate labor demand curve.
21
Initially the labor demand curves in both regions are depicted by the black curve
(ti, Ai, A
∗
i )12. Now suppose there is an increase in the ETR rate, ti, in industry
i. According to the analysis above, the aggregate labor demand in region 1 will
shift up without accounting for the changes in the residual demand. In contrast,
nothing changes in region 2 as no firms produce in industry i.20 For simplicity, we
ignore new entrants in both regions. This would be true when the entry cost is
large and the ETR change is small. However, we argue in footnote 17 that even
after taking new entrants into account, the demand curve in region 1 shifts more
than that in region 2. The aggregate demand curve in region 1 shifts to the solid
blue curve position, (t
′
i, Ai, A
∗
i )1, and the aggregate labor demand curve in region
2 stay in the black solid curve position (ti, Ai, A
∗
i )12.
20It is true that some firms may enter into industry i in region 2 after the increase in ETR. In
this case, the labor demand will also increase in region 2 because of the expanding labor demand
in industry i. Intuitively, the labor demand in industry i will increase more in region 1 relative
to region 2, as there are incumbent exporters in region 1 and also new entrants. Therefore, even
if considering the new entrants, we still have that in region 2 the aggregate labor demand curve
shift up less relative to that in region 1.
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Figure 3: The Different Indirect Effect
The equilibrium wage in region 1 becomes to ω2, and ω2 > ω1. This change
increases the residual demand of Ai and A
∗
i and drives up aggregate labor demand
in both regions. Therefore, the aggregate labor demand curve in region 1 shifts
from the solid blue curve to solid red curve, (t′i, A
′
i, A
∗′
i )1 while that in region 2
shifts from the solid black curve to the dash red curve, (t′i, A
′
i, A
∗′
i )2 . The regional
wage in region 1 and region 2 are ω4 and ω3, respectively, where ω4 > ω3.
So far, we have used figures to show that the indirect effect of ETR changes is
negative and exhibit regional difference.
3. Background and Data
In China, industrial composition differs significantly across regions. Candelaria
et al. (2013) show that the regional differences in industrial composition explain
about half of regional wage differences. The ratio of provincial exports to provincial
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GDP also varies considerably across provinces. During the period 2002-2006, the
minimum regional export share was less than 5%, while the maximum counterpart
was more than 70%. Table 1 reports the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of export
shares between 2002-2006.
[Table 1 is to be here]
Table 1 indicates significant differences in regional export shares. The da-
ta shows that the maximum regional export share is 20 times larger than the
minimum. These regional differences reflect the regional variation in industrial
composition.21
Export revenue is an important component in China’s GDP. In 2006, Chinese
export revenue accounted for 37% of GDP. Knowing the important role exports
play in its economy, the Chinese government announced a series of policies to
stimulate exports. The ETR system was established to encourage exports. It
partially refunds exporting firms the value-added and consumption tax they pay
for their inputs. In particular, the ETR is applicable for exporting firms engaged
in ordinary trade or processing trade with imported materials. For firms engaged
in processing trade with supplied materials, the value-added tax has already been
exempted when they purchase the inputs, and as such they cannot receive any
ETR. The ETR rates vary substantially across industries with a range from 0 to
17% in 2006. As a policy tool to adjust the composition of exports (e.g. shifting
China’s exports toward more value-added and high-tech products by providing
a high ETR in these industries), the ETR rate has been frequently modified.
From 2002 - 2012, more than 80% of products at 4 digit HS classification level
21The data is available in CEnet Statistics Database: http://db.cei.gov.cn/page/Default.aspx
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underwent at least one ETR change. The ETR system has proved effective in
boosting exports in China. Gourdon et al. (2014) show that every 1% increase in
the ETR rate in a given industry causes a 6% increase in export sales in the same
industry. In addition, the Chinese government increased the ETR rates several
times when faced with the East-Asian Crisis in 1997, which stabilized Chinese
exports and the economy. After 1999, a four-tired ETR system (17%, 15%, 13%,
and 5%) was implemented with an average ETR rate of 15%. In October 2003, the
Chinese government announced a reduction in the average ETR rate from 15.11%
to 12.11% due to fiscal pressures. Since January of 2004, a five-tired ETR system
(17%, 13%, 11%, 8%, and 5%) was implemented.
To conduct the empirical analysis, we match three sources of information. One
of the data sources is collected by the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS)
and contains a report of export quantities, and f.o.b values for exporting firms in
the eight-digit Harmonized System over the 2000-2006 period. The second data
source is from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF). The CASIF
dataset covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs with annual sales
above RMB 5 million, which is equivalent to approximately 700 thousand US
dollars.
We carefully matched the two datasets following Brandt and Zhang (2012)
using firm names, telephone numbers, and zipcodes. Table 2 provides annual
summaries of information from the matched sample. Since non-SOEs in the survey
dataset are those with annual sales of $770,000 or above, the non-SOEs in the
matched sample appear to be larger in scale than the small SOEs. According to
Table 2, the SOEs and non-SOEs in the matched sample account for 31.49% −
49.83% of total export value, and 25.14%− 49.83% of the number of all exporting
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firms. The export value of the matched sample accounts for 41.15% of total exports
on average.
[Table 2 is to be here]
Using the matched dataset, we compute the firm-product level TFP following
Foster et al. (2008), and developed by Hu et al. (2015):
lnTFPikt = ln qikt − αiK lnKikt − αiL lnLikt − αiM lnMikt (11)
where qikt is the physical units of output i exported by firm k in year t across
all destinations. Kikt, Likt and Mikt represent the firm-product-year measures of
capital, labor and materials input, respectively. αiK , αiL, and αiM are the input
share for capital, labor and intermediate materials, respectively.22
The third data source is the ETR rates from the Chinese Customs Information
Release Center23, which covers all exported products between 2002 - 2006. We
match this dataset with the CCTS data using HS codes. The weighted average
ETR in each region is constructed as follows:
ETR provjt =
∑
i
ETRit
expijt
GDPjt
(12)
where ETR provjt is the weighted average ETR of province j in year t, and expijt
is the export revenue of industry i in province j at year t, and GDPjt is the total
GDP of province j in year t. The regional weighted average ETR, ETR provjt,
varies across provinces and over time.
22The detailed procedures of construction input shares is in the Appendix.
23The web page is: http://www.china-customs.com
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Note that our model is best suited for manufacturing firms which export di-
rectly, but a considerable number of Chinese exporters are intermediary firms.
Following Ahn et al. (2011), we identify the set of intermediary firms by their
name24 and drop all of them in the empirical regressions.
Finally, we have a matched dataset of exporting firms with variables containing
firm-level export quantities and TFP, industry-level ETR rates, and the regional
revenue weighted ETR rates.
4. Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the model’s prediction of the direct and indirect impact
of the ETR on the firm-level intensive margin of exports. The direct and indirect
effects are captured by the industry-level ETR and regional weighted average ETR,
respectively.
lnQkijt = β0 + β1 lnETRit + β2 ln (ETR provjt) + β3 lnTFPkit + χ+ εkijt (13)
where Qkit is the export units of product i produced by firm k located in region j
in year t. ETRit is the ETR rate of industry i in year t, and ETR provjt is the
regional revenue weighted ETR in region j in year t. χ = χt + χi + χk + χj are
used to control for the year, industry firm and region fixed effects, respectively.
The results are reported in Table 2.
[Table 3 is to be here]
24Specifically, we identify the set of intermediary firms by their Chinese name that mean “trad-
ing”, “importer”, and “export”. In Pinying, the name containing these phrases: “jin4chu1kou3”,
“jing1mao4”, “ke1mao”, and “wai4jing1” is treated as intermediary firms.
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Table 3 indicates that an increase in the industry ETR rate will increase the
intensive margin of exports, while an increase in the regional weighted average
ETR will have the opposite effect. A positive impact of the industry ETR on
firms’ exports captures the impact of the firm-level rebate adjusted trade cost τ˜ ,
defined in equation (7). The negative impact of the weighted average ETR on the
intensive margin of exports captures the impact of changing regional wages. In
particular, the regions experiencing a weighted average ETR increase will expand
their exports and hence raise the regional labor demand. The rising regional labor
demand pushes up the regional wage, which in turn increases the exporting firms’
production costs. As such, a weighted average ETR increase has a negative impact
on firm-level exports. The direct impact of the ETR changes on a firm’s exports
dominates the indirect impact. These results are consistent with the model’s
predictions.
As mentioned in a series of papers by Dai et al. (2014), Yu (2013) and Gourdon
et al. (2014), processing trade is organized differently from ordinary trade. In
particular, firms engaged in the processing trade are typically less productive, and
rely more on global supply chains. Most importantly, the processing trade firms
with supplied materials do not qualify to receive the ETR as they are exempted
from paying value added tax when they purchase their inputs. To ease the concern
that the firms engaged in processing trade may potentially bias the empirical
results in Table 2, we estimate the coefficients in equation (13) using only firms
engaged in ordinary trade.
[Table 4 is to be here]
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In Table 4, the results show a similar pattern to that in Table 3. Every 1%
increase in industry ETR rate will increase the firm-level intensive margin of export
sales by 0.5%. In contrast, compared to a region experiencing no change in the
average regional ETR, a region experiencing a 1% increase in the average regional
ETR, will reduce its firms’ exports by about 0.2%.
A second concern arises from reverse causality: the Chinese government may
use the ETR to subsidize poor-performing industries and boost their exports. Al-
ternatively, the ETR may subsidize industries with high export-growth potential.
In either case, our regression framework may potentially suffer from endogeneity
bias. To address this issue we use an instrumental variable approach. During the
2002 - 2006 period, the Chinese government adjusted the ETR rates frequently
because of fiscal pressure (Chandra and Long, 2013). For each industry, the fiscal
pressure partially depends on the share of processing trade firms with supplied
materials, because these firms are not eligible to receive any rebate. This implies
that industries with a larger share of processing trade firms with supplied mate-
rials, will account for less fiscal pressure on the government, and will be subject
to smaller ETR reductions. Meanwhile, the share of processing trade within a
industry does not affect the firm-level export growth. Therefore, the export share
of processing trade with supplied materials in each exporting industry can be used
as an instrument. The results are reported in the second column of Table 4 and
Table 5 for the full sample and ordinary trade firms, respectively.
A third concern is selection bias. In particular, all firms experiencing changes
in the intensive margin of export sales are survivors. These firms may have higher
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growth potential compared to those firms which exit.25 This implies that the
impact of the ETR on the firm-level intensive margin of export sales might be
upward biased. To control for the selection bias, we implement the estimation in
two steps. In the first step, we compute the firm-level survival probability using a
Probit regression. In the selection equation, the selection variables contain firm-
level TFP, the quantity of sales in the last period, industry-year and region fixed
effects.
Pr(ykijt = 1) = Pr(α0 + α1 lnTFPk,t−1 + α2 ln saleki,t−1 + ψ + ξkijt > 0) (14)
where lnTFPk,t−1 and ln saleki,t−1 are firm-level log productivity and log sales in
last period, respectively, and ψ = ψt + ψi + ψj captures the year, industry, region
fixed effects.
In the second step, we add the survival probability into equation (13) and
use IV regressions to obtain the final estimates. We report the results with the
selection bias correction in the third column of Table 5 and Table 6 for the full
sample and ordinary trade, respectively.
[Table 5 is to be here]
[Table 6 is to be here]
The results in Table 5 and Table 6 imply that although the impact of the weight-
ed average ETR on firms’ exports fall, the effect is still negative and statistically
significant after controlling for the endogeneity and selection bias. Specifically, on
25Consistent with our theoretical model, some least productive firms exit when experiencing
an ETR increase, which leads to a higher regional wage.
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the one hand, every 1% increase in industry ETR rate will increase the firm-level
export sales by 0.2%. On the other hand, compared to a region experiencing no
change in the average regional ETR, exports will decrease by about 0.02% for firms
located in regions experiencing a 1% average regional ETR increase.
5. Robustness Check
We have conducted a series of robustness checks to verify our empirical results
obtained in the last section. The first robustness check relates to adding more
province-year controls. This is to ease the concern that the time varying provincial
level economic variables may also affect firm exports.26 We add provincial FDI
stocks and the number of special economic zones to control for regional openness
and policy-driven export advantages. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8,
respectively. The results are consistent with our baseline results: while an increase
in the ETR encourages firm-level exports, the increase in the average regional ETR
discourages firm-level exports.
[Table 7 is to be here]
[Table 8 is to be here]
Another concern arises from the validity of the IV we used in the regressions.27
Chandra and Long (2013) use the regional deficit rate as their instrumental variable
instead. The reason is that after 2003 the regional governments need to pay up
26We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check.
27We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the possibility that firms’ choice of
operating under the processing regime might be heavily influenced by credit constraints(Manova
and Yu , 2015). This may cause a non-zero correlation between the IV and the errors in the
current regressions.
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to 25% of the ETR requested by local exporters whose exports are in excess of
their 2003 level. The regional government’s fiscal deficit rate is constructed from
their region’s business tax revenue and government administrative expenditure as
follows:
deficitratejt =
(government administration expenditurejt − businesstax jt)
government administration expenditurejt
(15)
We re-estimate equation (13) using deficitratejt as an IV. As the quasi-natural
experiment is after 2004, following Chandra and Long (2013), we use samples over
2004-2006 period. The results are reported in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively.
The results still indicate that an increase in the ETR increases firm-level exports,
while the increase in the average regional ETR decrease firm-level exports. The
Magnitudes are all similar to those in Table 5 and Table 6.
[Table 9 is to be here]
[Table 10 is to be here]
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the Melitz (2003) model to investigate the impact of
ETR changes on the firm-level intensive margin of export sales. The model pre-
dicts that an increase in the ETR will have both a direct and indirect impact on
firms’ exports due to the immobility of the regional labor force. On one hand, an
increase in the ETR decreases firm-level variable costs, and hence increases firm-
level exports. On the other hand, an increase in the ETR increases local labor
demand as production expands among exporting firms. Rising local labor demand
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raises the regional wage, which drives up the variable production costs. As a re-
sult, firm-level export volumes decline. Using Chinese firm-level export data and
industry-level ETR rates during the 2002-2006 period, we test the predictions of
the model. The results indicate that an increase in the industry-level ETR increas-
es firm-level exports, while the increase in the weighted average ETR drives down
firm-level exports. The results are robust to controlling for potential endogene-
ity and selection bias. This paper suggests that, due to an unbalanced industrial
composition across regions, a national wide ETR policy would have differential
impacts on exports across Chinese provinces.
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Appendix (Tables)
Table 1: The Export Shares in Different Percentiles
Year 25th 50th 75th Min Max
2002 4.07% 5.72% 17.32% 3.20% 73.00%
2003 4.70% 7.10% 18.98% 3.84% 80.30%
2004 5.14% 6.84% 20.48% 4.26% 84.42%
2005 4.80% 7.78% 21.63% 3.53% 87.54%
2006 5.81% 8.39% 24.31% 4.35% 91.61%
Notes: Guandong Province has the largest export share during the period 2002-2003. The inland provinces, e.g.
Henan and Hunan, normally have the lowest export shares.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on the Matched Sample
Share of total
Export Value Export Volume Number of Exporters
2000 31.49% 22.86% 25.14%
2001 35.92% 22.12% 28.45%
2002 38.34% 23.11% 28.18%
2003 40.64% 27.17% 28.18%
2004 49.83% 36.08% 34.69%
2005 47.82% 37.14% 30.16%
2006 46.75% 38.30% 29.45%
Notes: On average, the export value of the matched sample accounts for 41.15% of the total export.
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Table 3: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Full Sample)
lnETRit 0.5540*** 0.5542***
(0.0236 ) (0.0236 )
lnETR provjt -0.1522***
(0.0107 )
lnTFPkt 0.6160*** 0.6160***
(0.0017 ) (0.0017 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.53 0.53
Obs 1,082,046 1,082,046
Notes: Table 3 presents the impact of the ETR on the firms’ export volume. Industry, year firm and region fixed
effects have been included. Standard errors are clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 4: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Ordinary Trade)
lnETRit 0.4668*** 0.4810***
(0.0258 ) (0.0258 )
lnETR provjt -0.2022***
(0.0124 )
lnTFPkt 0.6761*** 0.6762***
(0.0020 ) (0.0020 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
R2 0.56 0.56
Obs 777,060 777,060
Notes: Table 4 presents the impact of the ETR on the ordinary trade firms’ export volume. Industry, year
firm and region fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are clustered at province level, ***, ** and *,
respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 5: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Full Sample-IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.2024*** 0.1540***
(0.0404 ) (0.0415 )
lnETR provjt -0.055*** -0.0129**
(0.0045 ) (0.0046 )
lnTFPkt 0.6420*** 0.7075***
(0.0031 ) (0.0035 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
First Stage F-test 40.15 12.25
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0151***
(0.0008 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1516***
(0.0006 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0002***
R2 0.47 0.47
Obs 1,082,061 1,082,061
Notes: Table 5 presents the impact of the ETR on the exporting firms’ export volume by using IV regressions
and controlling for firm exit. Industry, year firm and region fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are
clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
37
Table 6: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Ordinary Trade-IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1350** 0.1879***
(0.0439 ) (0.0465 )
lnETR provjt -0.0579*** -0.0172**
(0.0053 ) (0.0056 )
lnTFPkt 0.6775*** 0.7926***
(0.0036 ) (0.0042 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
F-test for excluded instruments 35.70 12.15
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0315***
(0.0009 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1891***
(0.0006 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0000***
R2 0.49 0.49
Obs 777,052 777,052
Notes: Table 6 presents the impact of the ETR on the ordinary trade firms’ export volume by using IV regression
and controlling for firms’ exit. Industry, year firm and region fixed effects have been included. Standard errors
are clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 7: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Full Sample-More Controls)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1804*** 0.1470***
(0.0402 ) (0.0431 )
lnETR provjt -0.1206*** -0.0168**
(0.0071 ) (0.0062 )
lnTFPkt 0.6424*** 0.7162***
(0.0031 ) (0.0037 )
lnFDIjt 0.0505*** 0.2707**
(0.0045 ) (0.1140 )
Economic Zonesjt 0.1100*** 0.0751***
(0.0072 ) (0.0040 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
First Stage F-test 39.83 12.83
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0287***
(0.0009 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1846***
(0.0006 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0000***
R2 0.47 0.47
Obs 1,082,061 1,082,061
Notes: Table 7 presents the impact of ETR on exporting firms’ export volume by using IV regression and
controlling for firms’ exit. Industry, year firm and region fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are
clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 8: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Ordinary Trade-More Controls)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1444*** 0.1840***
(0.0429 ) (0.0482 )
lnETR provjt -0.0206*** -0.0243***
(0.0053 ) (0.0076 )
lnTFPkt 0.8151*** 0.7422***
(0.0107 ) (0.0044 )
lnFDIjt 0.0505*** 0.0425**
(0.0045 ) (0.0139 )
Economic Zonesjt 0.1100*** 0.0735***
(0.0072 ) (0.0040 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
First Stage F-test 35.10 12.72
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0326***
(0.0010 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1716***
(0.0007 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0000***
R2 0.49 0.49
Obs 777,052 777,052
Notes: Table 8 presents the impacts of the ETR on the ordinary trade firms’ export volume by using IV regressions
and controlling for firm exit. Industry, year firm and region fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are
clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 9: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Full Sample-New IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1820*** 0.1530***
(0.0402 ) (0.0356 )
lnETR provjt -0.0306*** -0.0356**
(0.0070 ) (0.0080 )
lnTFPkt 0.6420*** 0.7154***
(0.0031 ) (0.0037 )
lnFDIjt 0.0510*** 1.19e-7***
(0.0045 ) (2.40e-8 )
Economic Zonesjt 0.1080*** 0.0265***
(0.0072 ) (0.0081 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
First Stage F-test 39.83 12.90
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0287***
(0.0009 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1845***
(0.0006 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0000***
R2 0.48 0.48
Obs 649,236 649,236
Notes: Table 9 presents the impact of the ETR on all exporting firms’ export volume by using IV regressions and
controlling for firm exit. The sample contains firms in 2004-2006. Industry, year firm and region fixed effects have
been included. Standard errors are clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively, denoting significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 10: The Impact of ETR on the Firm-level Export Volume (Ordinary Trade-New IV)
IV IV+Selection
lnETRit 0.1098*** 0.1538***
(0.0437 ) (0.0434 )
lnETR provjt -0.0276*** -0.0291**
(0.0080 ) (0.0080 )
lnTFPkt 0.6778*** 0.7163***
(0.0036 ) (0.0037 )
lnFDIjt 0.0510*** 1.09e-7***
(0.0053 ) (2.41e-8 )
Economic Zonesjt 0.1198*** 0.0250***
(0.0084 ) (0.0081 )
Ownership Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
First Stage F-test 35.08 12.74
Select
lnTFPk,t−1 0.0327***
(0.0010 )
lnExpk,t−1 0.1717***
(0.0007 )
LR test (rho=0): 0.0000***
R2 0.49 0.49
Obs 466,231 466,231
Notes: Table 10 presents the impacts of the ETR on the ordinary trade firms’ export volume by using IV
regression and controlling for firms’ exit. The sample contains firms in 2004-2006. Industry, year firm and region
fixed effects have been included. Standard errors are clustered at province level, ***, ** and *, respectively,
denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Input Shares
We assume that the output of each product is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
function. To compute firm-product level productivity, we need to calculate in-
put shares for labor, materials and capital, αiL, αiM and αiK , respectively, for
each product i. Let ω˜kit denote firm k’s total nominal wage payments in year
t in industry i. Hsieh and Klenow (2008) suggest that the wage bill, ω˜kit tends
to underestimate the labor share in the Chinese manufacturing data. Following
their approach, we multiply each firm’s wage bill by a constant parameter, ρ˜, to
inflate the wage bill in each firm. We determine the size of the constant param-
eter by choosing the parameter so that the aggregate labor compensation in the
manufacturing sector matches the labor share in national accounts (roughly 50
percent).
Specifically, we denote the total, observed payments to workers as
tω =
∑
k
∑
t
ρ˜ω˜kit = ρ˜
∑
k
∑
t
ω˜kit = ρ˜t˜ω
where ρ˜ is the unknown inflation parameter we need to determine and t˜ω denotes
the total observed labor compensation. We denote total revenues tr and total
intermediate materials tm. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) suggest that the ratio of
total wage payments to value-added is roughly 50% from the Chinese national
accounts and input-output tables. This implies that
tω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒
ρ˜t˜ω
tr − tm = 0.5⇒ ρ˜ = 0.5
tr − tm
t˜ω
After ρ˜ is determined, we calculate the labor share in each of exporting industries
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we focus on as:
αiL =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜ω˜kit
r˜kit
where r˜kit are the nominal revenues of firm k in industry i, and N˜ is the total
number of firm observations in each year. Similarly, we calculate the intermediate
materials share as the average share of intermediate inputs in total revenues,
αiM =
1
N˜
∑
t
∑
k
ρ˜m˜kit
r˜kit
where m˜kit is the total value of intermediate materials firm k used in year t. Finally,
in the absence of reliable capital share information, we follow Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and assume constant returns to scale so that αiK = 1− αiL − αiM .
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Appendix (For Reviewer)
The ETR system refunds the pure exporting firms according to their export
revenues: ti
τ
p∗vq
∗
v , where p
∗
v = τ
σ
σ−1
ω
φv
, and q∗v = A
∗
i (p
∗
v)
−σ. However, the incomplete
ETR system in China only partially refunds most exporting firms, which makes
the non-rebatable part, r − τ˜2 (r is the official tax collection rate), an effective
tax on exports. The exporting firms’ optimization problem in the foreign market
becomes:
max
p∗v
(
p∗v − τ
ω
φv
)(
A∗i p
∗−σ
v
)− 1
τ
p∗v · A∗i p∗−σv (r − ti)
⇒ p∗v =
σ
σ − 1
(
τ˜
ω
φv
)
(A1)
where, τ˜ =
τ(
1− τ2
τ
σ
) 1
σ−1
, τ2 = r − ti
From equation (A1), the optimal quantity and the corresponding labor demand
for foreign markets are as follows:
q∗v = A
∗
i (p
∗
v)
−σ
= A∗i
[
σ
σ − 1
(
τ˜
ω
φv
)]−σ
⇒ lei (ω, φv, ti) = A∗
(
1
φv
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ (A2)
Proof of Equation (9.4)
Before proving inequality (9.4), we show the following three inequalities hold
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with respect to the productivity cutoffs
∂φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
∂ωj
> 0,
∂φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
∂ω−j
< 0 (A3.1)
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂ωj
> 0,
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂ω−j
< 0 (A3.2)
∂φ
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂ti
< 0 (A3.3)
where φ
i
(ωj, ω−j) is the productivity threshed where a firm earns zero profit in
the domestic market and φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti) is the productivity threshold where a firm
earns zero profit in the foreign market. Let ωj and ω−j denote the wage level
in region j and all other regions (including foreign countries), respectively. Note
that the domestic productivity cutoff only depends on the regional wage, while the
cutoff in the foreign market relies on both the regional wage and the ETR rate, ti.
The domestic profit for a firm with the cutoff productivity, φ
i
(ωj, ω−j), is de-
fined as:
pi =
(
σ
σ − 1
ωj
φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
− ωj
φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
)
A
(
σ
σ − 1
ωj
φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
)−σ
− ωjfi = 0
A =
∑
ωkLk
P
P σ; P =
[∑
j
∑
i
∫
φ
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
(
σ
σ − 1
ωj
φi
)1−σ
Mjf(φi)dφi
] 1
1−σ
where fi is the per-period fixed cost for each firm in industry i, A is the domestic
residual demand, and P is the price index in the domestic market. Notice that in
order to offer a clean proof, we have assume the substitution of elasticity between
any two products to be σ. Whereas, we are aware that the substitution of elasticity
between two varieties within the same industry, σ2 could be higher than σ1 the
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substititution of elasticity for any two varieties belonging to different industries,
σ2 > σ1.
28 Mj is the mass of firms from region j which produce for the domestic
market. We assume that Mj is determined by the free entry condition in each
region, and that further entry is not possible over a short period. We can compute
the domestic cutoff φ
i
(ωj, ω−j) as follows:
φ
i
(ωj, ω−j) =
( σσ−1)1−σ ω−σj ∑ωkLkP σ−1
σfi
 11−σ (A3.4)
We first claim that φ
i
(ωj, ω−j) is HD0 in (ωj, ω−j), which implies φi(ωj, ω−j) =
φ
i
(tωj, tω−j). This is because wage is a nominal term, if the wage in every region
including the foreign country29 simultaneously increases t times, this does not affect
the productivity cutoff, φ
i
(ωj, ω−j). As such, P is HD1 in (ωj, ω−j). The intuition
is that if the wage increases (or decreases) the same amont in every region, the
price index must increase (or decrease) the same amount.
Differentiating equation (A3.4) w.r.t. ωj
∂φ
i
(ωj, ω−j)
∂ωj
= sign
(
σω−σ−1j
∑
k
ωkLkP
σ−1 − ω−σj LjP σ−1 − ω−σj
∑
k
ωkLk(σ − 1)P σ−2 ∂P
∂ωj
)
28We also offer the proof under the more general case in which σ2 > σ1. The proof is available
upon request.
29For conceptual simplicity, we could treat the foreign country is another region, which is
denoted as region 0, and with wage ω0.
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σω−σ−1j
∑
k
ωkLkP
σ−1 − ω−σj LjP σ−1 − ω−σj
∑
k
ωkLk(σ − 1)P σ−2 ∂P
∂ωj
> (σ − 1)ω−σ−1j
∑
k
ωkLkP
σ−1 − ω−σj
∑
k
ωkLk(σ − 1)P σ−2 ∂P
∂ωj
= (σ − 1)ω−σ−1j
∑
k
ωkLkP
σ−1
[
1− 1
P
∂P
∂ωj
ωj
]
> 0
The last inequality holds because P is HD1 in (ωj, ω−j), which means
∑
j
∂P
∂ωj
ωj =
P. This further implies ∂P
∂ωj
ωj <
∑
j
∂P
∂ωj
ωj = P, and therefore 1 − 1P ∂P∂ωjωj >
1− 1
P
P = 0, which proves condition (A3.1). Since φ
i
(ωj, ω−j) is HD0 in (ωj, ω−j),
which implies that
∑
−j
∂φ
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ω−j
ω−j +
∂φ
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ωj
ωj = 0. Therefore,
∂φ
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ω−j
< 0
Similarly, among exporting firms, export profits can be shown to be decreasing
in the regional wage, ωj, and increasing in the ETR rate, ti. For a firm with
productivity φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti), its profit in the foreign market is:
pi∗ =
(
σ
σ − 1 τ˜ij
ωj
φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
− τ˜ij ωj
φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
)
A∗
(
σ
σ − 1 τ˜ij
ωj
φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
)−σ
− ωjf ∗i = 0
A∗ =
ω0L0
P ∗
P
∗σ; P ∗ =
[∑
j
∑
i
∫ (
σ
σ − 1
τ˜ijωj
φi
)1−σ
Mjf(φi)dφi
] 1
1−σ
where f ∗i is the per-period fixed cost in the foreign market for firms belonging to
industry i, A∗ is the foreign residual demand, and τ˜ij is the rebate-adjusted trade
cost for firms located in region j and export product i. τ˜ij = τ˜ij′ = τ˜i > 1, for
∀j, j′ and j 6= j′ 6= 0.30 For a foreign firm, τ˜i0 = 1. The wage and total labor in
30The rebate-adjusted trade cost is industry-specific, but in the foreign market, the foreign
firms do not pay this cost. We use the subscript j is to distinguish the different trade cost facing
foreign and domestic firms.
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the foreign country are denoted by ω0 and L0, respectively. We can compute the
productivity cutoff for firms from region j in the foreign market as follows:
φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti) =
[(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
τ˜−σij ω
−σ
j ω0L0 (P
∗)σ−1
σf ∗i
] 11−σ
(A3.5)
Differentiating equation (A3.5) w.r.t. ωj (j 6= 0)
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂ωj
= sign
(
−σω−σ−1j ω0L0 (P ∗)σ−1 + ω−σj ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂ωj
)
σω−σ−1j ω0L0 (P
∗)σ−1 − ω−σj ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂ωj
> (σ − 1)ω−σ−1j ω0L0 (P ∗)σ−1 − ω−σj ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂ωj
= (σ − 1)ω−σ−1j ω0L0 (P ∗)σ−1
[
1− 1
P ∗
∂P ∗
∂ωj
ωj
]
> 0
Simliar to the arguement in P, P ∗ is also HD1 in (ωj, ω−j). This implies that
∂P ∗
∂ωj
ωj <
∑
j
∂P ∗
∂ωj
ωj = P
∗, and therefore 1 − 1
P ∗
∂P ∗
∂ωj
ωj > 1 − 1P ∗P ∗ = 0. Thus we
have inequality (A3.2).
Likewise, differentiating equation (A3.5) w.r.t. ti
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂ti
=
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂τ˜i
∂τ˜i
∂ti
(A3.6)
∂φe
i
(ωj, ω−j, ti)
∂τ˜i
= sign
(
σω−σj τ˜
−σ−1
i ω0L0 (P
∗)σ−1 − ω−σj τ˜−σi ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂τ˜i
)
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σω−σj τ˜
−σ−1
i ω0L0 (P
∗)σ−1 − ω−σj τ˜−σi ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂ωj
> (σ − 1)ω−σj τ˜−σ−1i ω0L0 (P ∗)σ−1 − ω−σj τ˜−σi ω0L0(σ − 1) (P ∗)σ−2
∂P ∗
∂τ˜i
= (σ − 1)ω−σj τ˜−σ−1i ω0L0 (P ∗)σ−1
[
1− 1
P ∗
∂P ∗
∂τ˜i
τ˜i
]
> 0
P ∗ is HD1 in {τ˜i}Ni=0, and hence
∑
i
∂P ∗
∂τ˜i
τ˜i = P
∗. This is because that if the
rebate-adjusted trade cost increases (or decreases) the same amount in all industry
i and even for foreign firms, τ˜i0, it is equivalent to the same change in wages
{ωj, ω−j}. As a result, P ∗ will increase the same amount. The last inequality is
because 1 − 1
P ∗
∂P ∗
∂τ˜i
τ˜i > 1 − 1P ∗P ∗ = 0. Combining this result with ∂τ˜i∂ti < 0, we
have inequality (A3.3). Since φe
i
(ωj, ω−j) is HD0 in (ωj, ω−j), which implies that∑
−j
∂φe
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ω−j
ω−j +
∂φe
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ωj
ωj = 0. Therefore,
∂φe
i
(ωj ,ω−j)
∂ω−j
< 0
Now, we can prove inequality (9.4) by making use the regional labor market
clearing condition (Here, we suppress the region subscript j):
∑
k
∫
φ
k
[
lnek (ω, φ) + 1(φ > φ
e)lek(ω, φ, tk)
]
Mkfk (φ) dφ = L
⇔
∑
k
∫
φ
k
lnek (ω, φ)Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
lek(ω, φ,tk)Mkfk (φ) dφ = L (A3.7)
where Mk is the mass of firms in industry k located in a given region, and fk (φ)
is the truncated productivity distribution for φ(ω) ≥ φ
k
(ω) in industry k.
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Differentiating equation (A3.7) w.r.t. ti, we find
∑
k

∫
φ
k
∂lnek
∂ωj
Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
∂lek
∂ωj
Mkfk (φ) dφ− lnek
∂φ
k
∂ωj
− lnek
∂φe
k
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
X1
 ∂ωj∂ti
+
∑
−j
∑
k

∫
φ
k
∂lnek
∂ω−j
Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
∂lek
∂ω−j
Mkfk (φ) dφ− lnek
∂φ
k
∂ω−j
− lnek
∂φe
k
∂ω−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
X2
 ∂ω−j∂ti
= −
∫
φe
i
∂lei
∂ti
Mifi (φ) dφ+ l
e
i
∂φe
i
∂ti
(A3.8)
First, making use of the inequalities we have shown, we know X1 < 0, X2 > 0,
and the RHS of the equation is negative. In particular, X1 measures the within
region wage effect, and X2 captures the regional interaction effect (other regional
wage effect). If the second term on the LHS of equation (A3.8) (regional interaction
effect) is positive, we must have
∂ωj
∂ti
> 0. Suppose that the second term on the
LHS of equation (A3.8) is negative, which implies that at least one regional wage
decreases in ti. Among all regions experiencing a wage decrease in response to an
increase in ti, we pick the region with the largest wage reduction, say region j.
Denote the wage in region j as ω′j =
1
t
ωj, t > 1, after ti increases. The individual
firm’s labor demand after the increase in ti becomes
lne′ = A′
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ (
ω′j
)−σ
>
(
1
t
)σ
A
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
ω−σj t
−σ = lne
le′ = A∗′
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ (
τ˜ω′j
)−σ
>
(
1
t
)σ
A∗
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ωj)
−σ t−σ = le
(A3.9)
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where, lne′ and A′ are the domestic labor demand and residual demand after ti
increases, respectively. le′ and A∗′ are the foreign labor demand and residual de-
mand, respectively. These equalities arise because region j experiences the largest
wage reduction, and hence A′ >
(
1
t
)σ
A, and A∗′ >
(
1
t
)σ
A∗.31 Inequalities (A3.9)
imply that the individual labor demand in region j increases and hence the ag-
gregate labor demand must also increase after ti increases. As such, the regional
wage must increase to clear the labor market. This is a contradiction. Therefore,
the second term on the LHS of equation (A3.8) must be positive, and as a result
∂ωj
∂ti
must be positive.
31Recall that A and A∗ are both HD σ in ω. When other regions’ wage decrease are smaller
than t times, the residual demand will decrease less than t times.
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Proof of Equation (10)
When labor supply is fixed in each region, the impact of the ETR changes in
industry i on the regional wage is as follows:
L =
∑
k
[∫
φ
k
lnek (ω, φ)Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
lek(ω, φ, tk)Mkfk (φ) dφ
]
⇒ ∂L
∂ti
∆ti = 0
⇒
∑
k
[∫
φ
k
(
∂lnek (ω, φ)
∂ω
)
Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
(
∂lek(ω, φ, tk)
∂ω
)
Mkfk (φ) dφ
]
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti = 0
=
∑
k
[∫
φ
k
(
∂lnek (ω, φ)
∂ω
)
Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
(
∂lek(ω, φ, tk)
∂ω
)
Mkfk (φ) dφ
]
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti
+
∫
φe
i
∂lei (ω, φ, ti)
∂ti
Mifi (φ) dφ∆ti −Bk ∂ω
∂ti
∆ti − Ci∆ti
=
∑
k
−σ
ω
[∫
φ
k
[lnek (ω, φ)− fk]Mkfk (φ) dφ+
∫
φe
k
[lek(ω, φ, tk)− f ∗k ]Mkfk (φ) dφ
]
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti
− σ
∫
φe
i
[
lei (ω, φ, ti)− f
∗
i
]
τ˜Mifi (φ) dφ
∂τ˜
∂ti
∆ti −Bk ∂ω
∂ti
∆ti − Ci∆ti
=
(∑
k
−σ
ω
Lk
)
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti + L
e
i (−σ) τ˜
∂τ˜
∂ti
∆ti −Bk ∂ω
∂ti
∆ti − Ci∆ti
⇒ ∂ω
∂ti
∆ti =
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti∆ti − Ci∆ti∑
k
σ
ω
Lk +B
where B =
∑
k
Mk
[
lek(ω, φ
e
k
, tk)fk
(
φe
k
) ∂φe
k
∂ω
− σ
ω
[
fk
(
1− Fk(φk)
)
+ f ∗k
(
1− Fk(φek)
)] ]
Ci = l
e
i (ω, φ
e
i
, ti)Mifi(φ
e
i
)
∂φe
i
∂ti
Lek is the total labor demand for serving the foreign market in industry i, and Lk
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is the total labor demand in industry k. The third equation is derived as follows:
∂lnek (ω, φ)
∂ω
=
−σ
ω
[lnek (ω, φ)− fk] (A4.1)
∂lek(ω, φ, tk)
∂ω
=
−σ
ω
[lek(ω, φ, tk)− f ∗k ] (A4.2)
∂lei (ω, φ, ti)
∂ti
= A∗i
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(ω)−σ (−σ) τ˜−σ−1 ∂τ˜
∂ti
= A∗
(
1
φ
)1−σ (
σ
σ − 1
)−σ
(τ˜ω)−σ (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜
∂ti
=
[
lei (ω, φ, ti)− f
∗
i
]
(−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜
∂ti
(A4.3)
From (A4.3), we can derive the impact of ETR changes across all industries on
the regional wage:
∆ω =
∑
i
∂ω
∂ti
∆ti
=
∑
i
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti − Ci∑
j
−σ
ω
Lj +B
∆ti
=
∑
i
βi∆ti (A4)
where βi =
Lei (−σ) τ˜ ∂τ˜∂ti − Ci∑
j
−σ
ω
Lj +B
Define αi =
Lei∑
j Lj
, the share of labor in industry i for export production. It
is obviously that the absolute value of βi is increasing in αi. This is because that
all other things equal, when Lei increases, the absolute value of βi and αi increase
simultaneously.
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